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GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Interferences with international trade appear innocuous; they can
get the support of people who are otherwise apprehensive of
interference by government into economic affairs; ... yet there
are few interferences which are capable of spreading so far and
ultimately being so destructive of free enterprise.'
I. INTRODUCTION
World Trade Organization (WTO) talks in Cancun, Mexico, collapsed on
September 14, 2003.2 Part of a global round of trade talks launched in 2001
at Doha, Qatar, the Cancun Ministerial Conference was an opportunity to
expand trade and economic growth by further opening world markets.3 The
goal of the meeting was to liberalize international trade by establishing a fair
and market-oriented trading system aimed at improving market access,
eliminating export subsidies, and reducing domestic support.4 Unfortunately,
the meeting ended without trade ministers agreeing on key issues. At the heart
of the failure was an inability to develop modalities5 for agricultural trade
liberalization.6
'MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 57 (1962).
2 Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World Trade, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2003, at Al.
3Id.
4 MinisterialDeclaration, WTO Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess. (Doha), WTO Doc. WT/
MIN(0 1)/DEC/i (2001) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration], http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto.e/minist.emin0le/mindecl-e.pdf.
' The Doha Declaration refers to "modalities" without defining the term. See, e.g., id. para.
14. The Permanent Delegation of the European Communities (EC) proposed elements of
"modalities" in a February 24, 2003, communication to the Chairman of the General Council of
the WTO. Singapore Issues - The Question of Modalities, WTO General Council, paras. 1, 4,
WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/491 (2003). A group of twelve countries responded to the EC
communication, reiterating that the Doha Declaration does not define the term"modalities," and
criticizing the EC paper's approach to consideration of modalities as "superficial." Comments
on the EC Communication (WT/GC/W/ 491) on the Modalities for the Singapore Issues, WTO
General Council, paras. 6, 7, WT/GC/W/501 (2003). The group recommended defining
"modalities" from current WTO practice and stated that "[it is clear that the 'modalities' on
negotiations on an issue contains the aspects of the issue that are agreed on and the nature and
direction of obligations to be undertaken." Id. para. 6 (emphasis removed).
6 See Becker, supra note 2 (describing agriculture as the pivotal issue at the Cancun
conference). While agricultural issues were crucial, the collapse is more immediately attributable
to the contentious Singapore issues (so called because of their emergence at the Singapore
Ministerial Conference): trade and investment, trade and competition, transparency in
government procurement, and trade facilitation. See Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait
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Agriculture has long been the most protected sector of international trade.
In the United States, for instance, tariffs on agricultural goods have been an
element of federal policy since the country's inception.7 The policy today is
no different. The United States continues to impose a bound agricultural tariff
of twelve percent, while the global average remains at sixty-two percent.8
These numbers are significant because lower barriers to trade-particularly
trade in agricultural goods-allow for economic gains, poverty alleviation, and
a higher standard of living in developed and developing countries alike.9 Even
a forty percent tariff reduction would result in the world economy gaining $70
billion per year."0 A more extensive agreement reducing or eliminating all
trade-distorting support, like the one proposed at Cancun, could increase global
incomes by as much as $520 billion and lift 144 million people out of
poverty. "
The negotiations in Cancun illustrate the distance nations are willing to put
between themselves and protectionism. No member argued for more barriers
to trade; rather, each argued for some framework to facilitate trade.' 2 The
existence of various perspectives, however, caused disagreement on how best
to achieve this single aim. The United States and the European Union (EU)
formed one alliance, coming together one month before the Cancun conference
for the Won't-do Countries, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 22, 2003, at 23. For an explanation of
the difficulty in resolving the Singapore issues, see INT'L DEV. COMM., U.K. HOUSE OF
COMMONS, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO: ISSUES FORCANCUN, HC 400-I, at 45 (Sess.
2002-2003), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2002O3/cmselect/cmintdev/400/400.
pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2004).
' See, e.g., Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24 (1789) (imposing duties on a broad range
of goods including molasses, wine, malt, sugars, coffee, cocoa, salt, tobacco, indigo, fish, and
teas).
" THE INT'L AGRIC. TRADE RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, THE CURRENT WTO AGRICULTURAL
NEGOTIATIONS: OPTIONS FOR PROGRESS 10 (2001) [hereinafter OPTIONS FOR PROGRESS], http://
agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/pdLview.plpaperid=3 818.
' See Clare Short, Foreword by the Secretary of State for International Development to
U.K. Dep't for Int'l Dev., Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor
7 (2000) (discussing the international trading system's role in reducing poverty), http://www.
dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/whitepaper2000.pdf. See generally JOHAN NORBERG, IN DEFENSE OF
GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2003) (discussing significant connections between free trade, economic
growth, and poverty reduction).
'0 Thomas W. Hertel & Will Martin, Would Developing Countries Gain from Inclusion of
Manufactures in the WTO Negotiations?, Presentation at the Conference on WTO and the
Millennium Round (Sept. 11, 1999), at http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/down
load/42.pdf.
" Becker, supra note 2 (citing World Bank estimations).
12 See infra Part IIIA.1-3.
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by drafting a joint framework for negotiation of agricultural issues.' 3 They
hoped the proposal could provide impetus for constructive negotiations on
modalities and, more generally, invigorate the entire Cancun meeting. 4 A
diverse group of developing nations formed another camp, which came to be
known as the Group of 21 (G2 1).'" These nations coalesced to present their
own framework for agricultural negotiations in an effort to assert influence
within the WTO.'6 In this context, the freshly coupled United States and EU
on the one hand, and the surprisingly commanding G21 on the other, became
polarized in Cancun. The immediate result was merely a lack of consensus,
but the ultimate effect was to put an already delayed Doha Round 7 in serious
peril of not achieving the development goals aspired to in the Doha Declara-
tion."
This Note will discuss agricultural negotiations in the Doha Round and the
efforts that various entities, namely the United States, the EU, and the G2 1,
have put forth to liberalize trade and further encourage negotiations. More
specifically, this Note will analyze the modalities presented at the Cancun
Conference to derive a text that maximizes the economic development and
poverty reduction generated by a multilateral trading system. Part II provides
a backdrop for current negotiations, briefly recounting the history of multilat-
eral agricultural negotiations, paying particular attention to the Uruguay Round
"3 U.S. Dep't of State, Joint EC-U.S. Paper (Aug. 13, 2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/
Archive/2003/Dec/31-143080.html [hereinafter Joint Paper].
14 See Bruce Odessey, US.-EU Framework on Agriculture Seen as Way Out of WTO
Impasse (Aug. 13, 2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical1econ/wto/03081301 .htm.
15 When the G21 submitted their agricultural framework to the WTO, the countries
comprising the G21 were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines,
South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. Agriculture - Framework Proposal, WTO Ministerial
Conference, 5th Sess. (Cancfin), WTO Doc. WT/MIN(03)/W/6 (2003) [hereinafter G21
Communiqud].
16 Elizabeth Becker & Ginger Thompson, Poorer Nations Plead Farmers' Case at Trade
Talks, N.Y. TIvms, Sept. 11, 2003, at A3.
7 The Doha Round has failed to make all deadlines, including the March 31,2003, deadline
for establishing modalities. See Press Release, WTO Agriculture Negotiations, Farm Talks Miss
Deadline; But 'Work Must Go On,' Says Supachai (Mar. 31, 2003), http://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/pres03-e/pr336-e.htm.
"S Specifically, the Doha Declaration committed the WTO "to comprehensive negotiations
aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out,
all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support."
Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4, para. 13.
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Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). The URAA will be assessed in terms of
domestic support, market access, and export competition.
Part III focuses on the various modalities drafts presented in preparation for
Cancun, juxtaposing bilateral and regional trade agreements with comprehen-
sive multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the WTO to identify
the best method to further facilitate agricultural trade liberalization. Part III
also argues that an agreement within the WTO is preferable to regional
agreements and suggests that the draft modalities text presented in Cancun can
surpass the progress of the Uruguay Round while reconciling members'
differences. It then suggests methods that a final modalities agreement may
incorporate to expedite the demise of protectionism, such as ending certain
forms of domestic support and ceasing the developing world's drive for special
and differential treatment. Finally, the Note concludes that an agricultural
modalities agreement capable of liberalizing agricultural trade is at hand and
suggests eliminating Blue Box support and foregoing special and differential
treatment as methods to further engender trade within the existing framework.
II. BACKGROUND
A. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to be an organ of
the United Nations, was the first post-war effort to establish an international
body focused on trade. 9 Though the ITO never entered into force, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a provisional body designed to put
into effect provisions of the ITO, assumed the role of regulating and liberaliz-
ing world trade.2"
From the beginning, GATT performed poorly as an agricultural
liberalizer.2 First, rules were drafted in careful regard to domestic policies
rather than reforming domestic policies to meet a broader, more liberal
international trade standard.22 Article XI, for instance, provided for a general
'9 See generally KARIN KOCK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY AND THE GATT 1947-1967,
at 35-61 (1969) (outlining the formation and history of ITO).
20 Id. at 62-94 (outlining the formation and history of GATT).
21 See Dale E. McNiel, Furthering the Reforms ofAgricultural Policies in the Millennium
Round, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 41,44 (2000) (explaining that "the rules of the GATT have
always contained exceptions that permitted governments to pursue protectionist and mercantilist
policies in the agricultural sector").
22 MELAKU GEBOYE DESTA, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL
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prohibition on quantitative and other non-tariff border barriers, but contained
many exemptions for agriculture. 23 Thus, contracting parties were allowed to
maintain export restrictions or prohibitions to relieve critical shortages and to
maintain import restrictions that were "necessary to the enforcement of
governmental measures., 24  Restrictions on domestic support were also
minimal: Article XVI only required a member utilizing subsidies to notify
GATT.25 Second, parties were routinely issued waivers that effectively
relieved them of GATT obligations.26 For example, the U.S. agricultural
waiver of 1955 effectively placed U.S. agriculture wholly outside GATT
regulation. 27 Lastly, where GATT rules did not conform to state policy, many
states flagrantly disregarded the international trade regime in favor of
protectionism.28
B. Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
Trade ministers launched the Uruguay Round in 1986 with a strong
mandate to overcome the shortfalls of GATT and develop an effective
international trade regime.29 They declared that "[n]egotiations shall aim to
achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all measures
affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more
operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines."3° Actually achieving
such goals proved arduous, however. "The objectives of the main participants
often seemed diametrically opposed., 31 The domestic policies they sought to
uphold embodied little concern for strengthening international trade and
working within an international framework.
PRODUCTS 7 (2002).
23 Id. at 35-59.
24 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 224-28 [hereinafter GATI].
25 Id. art. XVI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 250.
26 GEBOYE DESTA, supra note 22, at 7, 283.
27 See KOCK, supra note 19, at 164.
2' GEBOYE DESTA, supra note 22, at 7; see KoCK, supra note 19, at 170-76 (discussing an
expert groups examination of the "widespread resort to agricultural protection" and GATT's
ineffectiveness as an instrument for the promotion of trade).
29 See McNiel, supra note 2 1, at 52 (discussing the contracting parties' agreement that there
was an "urgent need to bring more discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade").
" GATT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations,
Sept. 20, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623, 1626 (1986).
11 JoHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 92 (2d ed. 1999).
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The two negotiating groups most at odds were the United States and the
EU, two giants on the world agriculture market. The United States, joined by
the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries,32 advocated the boldest
reforms.33 Most controversial, particularly to the EU, was the U.S. "zero
option" that "call[ed] for the complete abolition of all trade-distorting support
and protection within ten years."34 This was troublesome to the EU because
its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), successful in transforming the EU into
a net food exporter, used extensive subsidy payments to make domestically
grown products competitive in the world market and employed import duties
to keep prices artificially high. Thus the EU was content to maintain the
status quo and "regard[ ] the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations as a
damage limitation exercise,"36 which entailed pulling the United States away
from the "zero option."37
Because attention was focused on the substantial crevasse separating the
United States and the EU, developing nations were largely ignored in the
Uruguay Round's agricultural negotiations.3 " In general, the agricultural
policy of most developing nations before the Uruguay Round was to transfer
income from rural farmers to urban dwellers.39 This was achieved through
taxing agricultural exports and subsidizing agricultural imports, and through
state agency purchasing at less than world market prices.4 ° In this context,
developing nations negotiated with a view toward raising depressed income
levels in the farm sector by lessening tariffs in the developed world, thus
2 The Cairns Group is comprised of seventeen countries: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. The Cairns Group, An
Introduction, http://www.cairnsgroup.org/introduction.html (last visited May 11, 2005).
33 CROOME, supra note 31, at 93.
3' K.A. Ingersent et al., The EC Perspective, in AGRICULTURE IN THE URUGUAY ROUND, 55,
83 (K.A. Ingersent et al eds., 1994).
35 CROOME, supra note 31, at 94.
36 Ingersent et al., supra note 34, at 82.
37 Id. at 82-83.
38 L. Alan Winters, The LDCPerspective, in AGRICULTURE IN THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra
note 34, at 157, 157-81 ("suggest[ing] that developing countries are generally unable to
influence the critical political decisions affecting their trade" particularly regarding agriculture,
referring to developing countries' "political weakness," and stating that "[t]he developing
countries are not major players in the Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations").
'9 Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
Food, Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 446 (2002).
40 Id.
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opening unexploited markets, and incorporating special and differential
treatment to maintain sheltered domestic markets.4'
Despite the widely divergent concerns of the United States, the EU, and
developing nations, trade ministers reached an agreement in Marrakesh,
Morocco, on April 15, 1994, to overcome GATT shortfalls and further
liberalize international trade.42 The Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations not only established the
WTO, a body to regulate international trade,43 but crafted a number of separate
agreements to reduce protectionism.' One of these agreements, the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), specifically targeted agriculture
through improvements in market access, domestic support, and export
competition.45 The scope of the URAA surpassed that of agricultural
agreements in previous trade rounds and removed agriculture's long-protected
status, or "exceptionalism," from international disciplines.46
1. Domestic Support
The URAA established a protocol, the Aggregate Measure of Support
(AMS), to provide a standard gauge for domestic subsidies.47 The AMS is "the
annual level of support, expressed in monetary terms, provided for an
agricultural product in favour of the producers of the basic agricultural product
or non-product-specific support provided in favour of agricultural producers
in general." ' Not included in the AMS is "Green Box" support, support that
41 Id. at 451. But see Winters, supra note 38, at 178 (arguing that special and differential
treatment, despite being demanded by developing country negotiators, poorly serves their
economic interests and undermines bargaining leverage).
42 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143, available at http://www.wto.
org/english/docs-e/legaLe/03-fa.pdf.
43 Id. (referring to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144,
available at http://www.wto.org/englishldocse/legaLe/04-wto.pdf).
44 See, e.g., WTO Agreement, supra note 43, List of Annexes.
" Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S.
410, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legaLe/14-ag.pdf.
46 Randy Green, Agreement onAgriculture: The Uruguay RoundAgreement on Agriculture,
31 LAW& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 819, 820 (2000).
" Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 45, art. 1(a), 1867 U.N.T.S. at 410-11.
48 Id. Total Aggregate Measure of Support is "the sum of all domestic support provided in
favour of agricultural producers, calculated as the sum of all aggregate measures of support for
basic agricultural products, all non-product-specific aggregate measurements of support and all
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has "no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on
production."4 9 Rather, AMS measures the most trade-distorting payments, or
"Amber Box" support." The URAA obliged developed countries to reduce
Total AMS for the 1986-1988 base period by twenty percent over six years.5
Less developed countries are obliged to reduce their AMS by twenty percent
over ten years, and least developed countries have no reduction
commitments.5 2
2. Market Access
Article 4 of the URAA provides for "tariffication," which is conversion of
"non-tariff import barriers into ... their tariff equivalents."53 Tariffication
alone does not improve market access, however, because allowable tariff
levels, based on the 1986-1988 base period, are high enough to continue the
protection afforded by non-tariff barriers.54 As a result, the URAA addition-
ally calls for tariffs on agricultural products to be reduced by a minimum and
average amount:
equivalent measurements of support for agricultural products." Id. art. 1(h), 1867 U.N.T.S. at
411-12.
41 Id. Annex 2, para. 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. at 425. Non-trade distorting support, allowed without
limitation, is also called "Green Box" support. WTO and OECD Support Indicators, OECD IN
WASHINGTON, Aug-Sept. 2003, at 3, 3, available at http://www.oecdwash.org/NEWS/LOCAL/
oecdwash-aug-sept2003.pdf. Green Box support includes research, pest and disease control,
training services, extension and advisory services, inspection services, marketing and promotion
services, and infrastructural services. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 45, Annex 2, para.
2, 1867 U.N.T.S. at 425-26. In contrast, "Blue Box" support is support designed to limit
production, but with less trade distorting effects than "Amber Box" support. WTO and OECD
Support Indicators, supra. Members are not supposed to increase "Blue Box" spending, but
have not agreed to reductions. Id.
'0 "Amber Box" support, which is measured by AMS, consists of direct payments to farmers
and generally serves to support prices. WTO and OECD Support Indicators, supra note 49, at
3.
"' AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 9 (Konstantinos Adamantopoulos
ed., 1997); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE URUGUAY
ROUND 17 (1995).
52 AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 5 1, at 9.
" GEBOYE DESTA, supra note 22, at 67. "[N]on-tariff barriers [are converted] to tariffs
based on the difference between average 1986-88 internal prices and world market prices."
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 51, at 15.
54 See GEBOYE DESTA, supra note 22, at 67. "Dirty tariffication" refers to the manipulation
of internal prices or world market prices in the base period so the allowable tariff conversion is
extraordinarily high and poses no actual restriction. Id. at 75.
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Each tariff line was required to be reduced by a minimum of 15
per cent while the average minimum was 36 per cent. The
corresponding figures for developing countries are two-thirds of
those relating to developed countries (i.e. 24 per cent average and
10 per cent per tariff line) to be implemented over a period of up
to 10 years. Least-Developed countries are required only to
tariffy and bind their tariffs; they are not obliged to undertake
reduction commitments. 5"
Where few imports took place in the base period due to restrictive regimes,
tariffication is rendered ineffective because of the high tariff conversion (i.e.,
a complete ban on the import of a product would yield an infinite tariff
equivalent). Thus the URAA established minimum access opportunity
requirements that require members to implement minimal tariffs on a given
import until that import represents three percent of domestic consumption for
the base year (and five percent of the base figure by 2000)."
Notably, Article 5 (the special safeguard clause) still allows for protection-
ist measures in extreme circumstances to compensate for the vulnerabilities a
country may experience after binding its tariffs.57 A member may invoke the
special safeguard clause if the volume of an entering import exceeds a
predetermined trigger level that varies by country and is based on existing
import levels for that country. 8 Alternatively, if the price of a given import
falls below a predetermined trigger price, then a member may also invoke the
special safeguard clause.59
3. Export Competition
Lastly, the URAA made modest progress in reducing export subsidies.6"
Members are prohibited from utilizing export subsidies on all non-scheduled
items while they may continue to use the export subsidies enumerated in
Article 9.1, subject to reduction commitments.6 The reduction commitments
11 Id. at 73-74.
56 Id. at 77; AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 51, at 8-9.
5 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 45, art. 5, 1867 U.N.T.S. at 413-15.
I ld. art. 5, para. 1(a), 1867 U.N.T.S. at 413.
Sld. art. 5, para. 1(b), 1867 U.N.T.S. at 413.
6' Export subsidies are defined as "subsidies contingent upon export performance." Id. art.
1(e), 1867 U.N.T.S. at 411.
6' GEBOYE DESTA, supra note 22, at 241.
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pertain to budget expenditures and quantities exported: budget expenditures
for export subsidies in developed countries must be reduced by thirty-six
percent over a six-year period from the 1986-1990 base period, while
developing countries must make a twenty-four percent reduction over a ten-
year period. No reduction is required for the least developed countries. 62
Also, "quantities exported with subsidies [must] be reduced by 21 per cent
over six years" in developed countries and fourteen percent over ten years in
developing countries.63
In sum, the Uruguay Round was an important first step towards the
formation of a legitimate global trade regime capable of removing barriers to
trade. Unlike the GATT, the URAA calls for specific and substantial
commitments from members and removes agriculture's exceptionalism,
making it instead a focal point of negotiations. Among the major accomplish-
ments were improvements in market access and transparency from
tariffication, classification and reduction measures for the domestic supports
that mostly distort trade, and restrictions on the use of export subsidies.'
Despite considerable progress, the URAA leaves much to be desired.
Domestic support commitments, anchored in the 1986-1988 base period when
domestic support was extraordinarily high, "generally did not require countries
to do anything they had not already done.""5 Two hundred thirty-five billion
dollars was still transferred to agricultural producers in 2002,66 much of which
was originally classified as "Amber Box" and shifted into the "Blue Box" or
"Green Box" categories to reduce "Total AMS" to meet URAA
commitments.67
In the area of market access, post-Uruguay Round, bound agricultural
tariffs still average sixty-two percent, the highest tariffs coming from the
developing world.68 Similarly, export subsidies, which remain legal on
scheduled items, now total over $27 billion for members, ninety percent of
62 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5 1, at 17.
63 Id.
64 See OPTIONS FOR PROGRESS, supra note 8, at 1-9.
" Green, supra note 46, at 822.
66 Subsidies to Agriculture: Why?, OECD IN WASHINGTON, Aug.-Sept. 2003, at 3, 3,
available at http://www.oecdwash.org/NEWS/LOCAL/oecdwash-aug-sept2003.pdf.
67 OPTIONS FOR PROGRESS, supra note 8, at 19 (noting that "[o]ver [sixty] percent of the
domestic support in OECD countries is now excluded from reduction commitments").
68 Id. at 10 (indicating that developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and South Asia
have average bound tariffs ranging from 71-113%, while the EU and United States have bound
agricultural tariffs of 30% and 12%, respectively).
2005]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
which are paid by the EU alone.69 There has also been a proliferation in the
use of export credits,7" possibly in an effort to circumvent export subsidy
restrictions.7'
Lastly, developing countries argue that developed countries such as the
United States, which produces twice as much wheat as its population needs,
use food aid as a form of export subsidy, paying farmers for excess supply to
be shipped overseas, rather than buying locally-sourced products.72
C. Doha Declaration
In the face of protectionism left intact by the URAA, trade ministers seized
authority under Article 20 of the URAA and, in the Doha Declaration,
reaffirmed "the long-term objective ... to establish a fair and market-oriented
trading system through a programme of fundamental reform encompassing
strengthened rules and specific commitments on support and protection in
order to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in world agricultural
markets."73 They then committed the WTO to "comprehensive negotiations
aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a
view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions
in trade-distorting domestic support."74
The Declaration was applauded from all quarters for its potential, if not for
its substance. James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, stated that "[a]
'good' pro-poor Doha agreement that lowered tariff peaks and averages in both
rich and developing countries could produce up to $520bn in income gains,
benefiting rich and poor alike. Such an agreement would increase growth in
developing countries and would lift an additional 140m people out of poverty
69 Id. at 15.
70 Export credit can take the form of government loans with terms more favorable than those
available on the private market, interest rate subsidies, government assumption of default on
private loans, or government-supported or-subsidized insurance offered to private lenders. Id.
at 17.
"' Id. (citing an Organization for Economic Cooperation Development report that indicates
a rise in export credits from $5.5 billion in 1995 to $7.9 billion in 1998).
7 Roger Thurow & Scott Kilman, Seed of Discord: As U. S. Food Aid Enriches Farmers,
Poor Nations Cry Foul, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2003, at Al.
7' Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4, para. 13.
14 Id. Paragraph 14 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration states that "[m]odalities for the
further commitments, including provisions for special and differential treatment, shall be
established no later than 31 March 2003," a goal that was not achieved. Id. para. 14.
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by 2015."" The Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) agreed, concluding "that it is in the
interest of the people of OECD countries to reduce, and even eliminate, tariffs
and export subsidies in agriculture."76  Thus, amid wide recognition of
agricultural liberalization's enormous benefits and the potential of the Doha
Round to deliver those benefits, various modalities texts were introduced in
preparation for the Cancun Ministerial Conference.
HI. ANALYSIS
The first step in realizing the objectives of the Doha Declaration is to
establish modalities. This section will first conduct a detailed examination of
the modalities drafts proposed before the Cancun meeting. Each will be
analyzed according to domestic support, market access, and export competi-
tion. Then, trade liberalization by means of bilateral and regional agreements
will be explored before returning to the multilateral context and the search for
a modalities draft in the WTO. Finally, this section will elucidate mechanisms
by which a consensus can be obtained and expanded.
The United States and EU made the first attempt at constructing a
modalities draft. With Cancun looming on the horizon, neither party could
come to terms with the other's demands. The U.S. WTO Agriculture Proposal,
presented mid-summer 2002, went far in reforming agricultural trade, calling
for the total elimination of export subsidies, aggressive cuts in agricultural
tariffs through the use of a harmonizing formula,77 and restriction of trade-
distorting domestic support to five percent of the total value of agricultural
production.7"
" James Wolfensohn, A Good 'Pro-Poor' Cancun Could Help Rich as Well, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 8, 2003, at 19.
76 Honorable Donald J. Johnston, Speech at the Cancun Ministerial Meeting (Sept. 11,
2003), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/3/12970704.pdf.
" "Harmonizing reductions... make steeper cuts on higher tariffs, bringing the final tariffs
closer together (to 'harmonize' the rates)." WTO, Reduction Methods, at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/agric-e/agnegs-swissformula-e.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2005). One method
ofharmonizing reductions employs "[m]athematical formulas designed to make steeper cuts (i.e.,
higher percentage cuts) on higher tariffs." Id. The United States' proposal calls for the use of
the Swiss 25 formula, which can be expressed as T, = (To*a)/(To+a), where T, is the new tariff,
To is the current tariff, and a is the tariff ceiling (twenty-five percent). Foreign Agricultural
Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Market Access: The Swiss 25 Formula in Action, at http://www.fas.
usda.gov/itp/wto/marketaccess.htm (last modified Mar. 24, 2004).
78 Foreign Agriculture Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., The U.S. WTO Agriculture Proposal, at
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The EU presented its own proposal, albeit less sweeping, that suggested a
thirty-six percent average tariff reduction instead of a harmonizing formula and
maintenance of URAA domestic support disciplines.79 U.S. agricultural
interests responded harshly, accusing the EU of working to undermine trade
liberalization and introducing new barriers to trade.8 ' These criticisms were
echoed in Congress and led the United States to exert continued pressure on
the EU to liberalize agricultural trade."1 Thus, unable to reconcile their
differences, the United States and EU appeared ready to maintain separate
positions in Cancun.
A. Modalities Texts
On March 18, 2003, amidst the U.S.-EU struggle, Ambassador Stewart
Harbinson of Hong Kong-active in his capacity as chairman of the WTO
Committee on Agricultural Negotiations-produced the first modalities draft
(Harbinson Proposal) to bridge gaps in the negotiating positions of the various
members.
1. Harbinson Proposal
Chairman Harbinson drafted a modalities paper that incorporated elements
of both the U.S. and EU proposals.8 2 Market access provisions fell closer to
the U.S. position by calling for graduated tariff cuts over a five-year period,
though a simple average reduction was used instead of the U.S.-favored
http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/proposal.htm (last modified Mar. 24, 2004) [hereinafter U.S.
WTO Agriculture Proposal].
7' Press Release, European Union, WTO & Agriculture: EU Takes Steps to Move
Negotiations Forward (Jan. 27,2003), http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2003/2003004.htm.
go Letter from AgTrade to the Honorable Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade
Representative (Jan. 22, 2003), http://www.affi.com/policy-letters-euletter.pdf.
"1 See Memorandum from Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator, to Reporters and Editors (Jan. 29,
2003) (describing the EU proposal as leaving much to be desired), http://grassley.senate.gov/
releases/2003/p03r01 -29ahtm.
82 Although referred to as one document in this section, the Harbinson Proposal consists of
two documents. The first is Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for Further
Commitments, WTO Comm. on Agriculture, Special Sess., WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/I1 (2003), and
the second, the basis of the analysis in this Note, is the revised draft of that document,
Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for Further Commitments: Revision,
WTO Comm. on Agriculture, Special Sess., WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1/Rev. 1 (2003) [hereinafter
Harbinson Proposal].
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harmonizing formula. s3 Also in line with the U.S. proposal, the Proposal
provided for more rigorous rules for state trading enterprises.8 4 Conversely,
the Proposal's domestic support provisions reflected the EU's position.
Paragraph 41 maintained the URAA domestic support framework and declined
to pursue the EU-maligned five percent domestic support cap.85 Further, the
Proposal emulated the EU's position on export credits and food aid. 6 Notably,
there were also provisions in the Proposal directed to the interests of
developing nations. In the area of market access, for instance, a negative-list
approach was created whereby developing nations could exempt "special
products" from general tariff reduction commitments. 7
Despite making substantial progress, the Harbinson Proposal failed to find
enough common ground.8 The United States voiced several objections. First,
it viewed the Proposal's tariff reduction commitments as ineffective because
they allowed high tariffs on sensitive products to remain in place. 9 Also in the
market access arena, the United States was displeased with the use of a simple
average tariff reduction instead of a harmonizing formula because the EU's
tariff levels could remain extremely high compared to those in the United
States.9" Second, the United States expected deep cuts in Amber and Blue Box
payments, but the Harbinson Proposal only preserved the status quo as set out
in the URAA. 9
Harbinson Proposal, supra note 82, para. 8.
84 Id. para. 27.
8 Id. para. 41.
86 Id. paras. 36-37.
17 Id. para. 11.
" The Harbinson Proposal was formally rejected at the WTO Tokyo "mini-ministerial,"
which was designed to sample the status of trade negotiations prior to the Cancun meeting. Ken
Belson, World Trade Talks in Japan Falter After Three Days, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,2003, at A3.
9 Japan, for instance, only has an average tariff of 51%, but exacts a 490% tariff on rice
imports. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Agriculture Official Says WTO Proposal Too
Limited (Feb. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Hegwood], http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/
03022101 .htm. The Harbinson Proposal calls for a 45% reduction in tariffs over 90%, thereby
leaving Japan's rice tariffs at a remarkably high 270%. Id. By contrast, the Swiss Formula
would lower the tariff to 24%.
90 See Christopher S. Rugaber, Senate Panel Criticizes Harbinson WTO Proposal on
Agriculture Trade, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 415 (Mar. 6, 2003).
9' In 2000, EU domestic support payments totaled $68 billion while the United States spent
$24 billion. Hegwood, supra note 89. The Harbinson Proposal would reduce EU spending to
$42 billion and U.S. spending to $12 billion, a result deemed inequitable and unacceptable by
the United States. See id.; Harbinson Proposal, supra note 82, para. 41.
2005]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The EU also expressed dissatisfaction. Agricultural Commissioner Franz
Fischler stated that "we find few elements which offer the possibility of
bridging the differences between WTO members."92 With regard to export
subsidization, the EU viewed the Proposal as unbalanced because they were
being asked to completely phase out such subsidies over a five-year period.93
At the same time, alternative forms of export subsidization more heavily used
by the United States, like export credits and farm aid, were kept intact.94 The
EU also criticized measures to reduce domestic support, their chief complaint
being that the Proposal reduced non-trade distorting Blue Box support,95 but
did not restrict U.S. de minimis spending96 that is trade-distorting by
definition.97
Developing nationsjoined in the chorus of complaints. Although paragraph
11 exempts "special products" from reduction commitments, developing
nations were nervous about the lack of specificity in the Proposal regarding the
number of products to be included in the "special products" category.98 Also,
the Proposal did not incorporate a countervailing mechanism to enable
developing nations to raise tariffs in an amount proportionate to the level of
subsidization in other countries.99
2. Joint EC-U.S. Paper
As the summer of 2003 concluded, agricultural negotiations appeared dead
in the water. Members decisively rebuked the Harbinson Proposal. Further,
the two parties best able to restart negotiations, the United States and EU,
appeared unwilling to reconcile their differences. But surprisingly, the two
reached a common negotiating position a mere six months after abandoning the
92 Press Release, European Union, EU's Fischler Says, "Harbinson Draft Won't Bridge
Gaps" in WTO Agriculture Talks (Feb. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Fischler], http://www.eurunion.
org/News/press/2003/20030 1 O.htm.
93 Id.
94 Id. paras. 36-37.
9' Fischler, supra note 92; Harbinson Proposal, supra note 82, para. 44.
96 De minimis spending is support not required to be included in a Member's AMS. See
Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 45, art. 6, para. 4, 1867 U.N.T.S. at 415-16.
9' Harbinson Proposal, supra note 82, para. 44; see Daniel Pruzin, EU's Fischler Lobbies
Harbinson to Change Treatment of EU, U.S. Ag Subsidies in Text, INT'L TRADE REP., Mar. 13,
2003, at 456.
9' See Walden Bello, The AoA: Institutionalizing Monopolisitic Competition, INQ7.net, at
http://www.inq7.net/opi/2003/sep/01/opLwbello- 1.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2005).
99 Id.
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Harbinson Proposal and less than one month before negotiations were to begin
in Cancun. The Joint Paper they produced can be faulted for vagueness and
failing to address several important issues, but it is nonetheless remarkable for
finding common ground between the United States and EU and for serving as
a starting point for Cancun.' ° Behind the Joint EC-U.S. Paper was a
recognition that agriculture lay at the heart of all WTO negotiations. If
negotiations regarding agriculture did not move forward, then nothing in the
WTO was to move forward.' 10
The Joint Paper begins by harkening back to the objectives of the Doha
Declaration, which includes "the objective to establish a fair and market-
oriented system through fundamental reform in agriculture," and also
recognizes that "special and differential treatment for developing countries will
be an integral part of the negotiations, and that non-trade concerns should be
taken into account."' 2 These statements alone were a major step for both
parties, perhaps signaling a serious willingness on behalf of the EU to reform
its enormous CAP and openness by the United States and EU to negotiate non-
trade concerns.
In the area of domestic support, the Joint Paper demonstrates a level of
respect for both parties' interests. For example, Amber and Blue Box support
are not equated like the United States proposed earlier. Instead, Amber Box
support is reduced by an unspecified range,0 3 while less trade-distorting
domestic support is permitted but capped at five percent of the total value of
agricultural production.'" The Joint Paper also addresses the EU's complaints
concerning the Harbinson Proposal's one-sided approach to domestic support
by reducing de minimis spending.' 5
The Joint Paper found further consensus by introducing truly hybrid market
access provisions. Some tariffs are reduced by a simple average (the approach
used in the URAA and preferred by the EU).'0 6 Other tariffs are reduced using
10 An Agreement to Deal, ECONOMIST, Aug. 16, 2003, at 65.
10! Conference Call to Discuss Agriculture Trade Negotiations at the WTO with Allen
Johnson, Ambassador, Chief Agricultural Negotiator (Aug. 13, 2003) (quoting chief U.S.
agricultural trade negotiator Allen Johnson as saying, "If agriculture doesn't move forward,
nothing is going to move forward"), at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/agtranscript
030813.htm.
102 Joint Paper, supra note 13.
o3 Id. para. 1.1.
1o" id. para. 1.2(ii).
105 Id. para. 1.3.
106 The tariffs in this category would be subject to an average and minimum tariff cut, thus
improving market access for even sensitive products. Market access could also be improved
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the Swiss harmonizing formula (the United States' preferred method),"°7 and
all tariffs are essentially capped.' For developing nations, the Joint Paper
includes a special agricultural safeguard along with special and differential
treatment that includes lower tariff reductions and a broader time horizon for
implementation.0 9 Unfortunately, the Joint Paper does not elaborate on the
details of developing nation treatment.
Lastly, the Joint Paper's treatment of export competition is in line with EU
demands, reducing export subsidies with a view toward phasing them out "on
a schedule that is parallel in its equivalence of effect on export subsidies and
export credits."' " Thus, the Joint Paper eliminates the unbalanced approach
of the Harbinson Proposal whereby EU-utilized export subsidies were
restricted but U.S.-utilized export credits went untouched. Instead, export
subsidies and credits are linked together and reduced in tandem. Accordingly,
reductions in export subsidies are reflected by equal reductions in export
credits."' Specifically regarding export credits, the Joint Paper reduces export
credits by restricting repayment terms to those available in commercial
practice." 2 Also, the Joint Paper suggests both regulating food aid to avoid
displacement on the commercial market and protocols for disciplining state
trading enterprises, but the details of such guidelines are sparse." 3
With the above provisions, the Joint Paper assumed the form of an
agreement in principle; an agreement in practice was seemingly achievable via
more extensive negotiations. Ultimately, the real challenge remains in arriving
at a more precise agreement by filling in acceptable numbers.' While it is
easy for the United States to agree to reduce de minimis spending, for instance,
deciding on the exact level of reduction will be considerably more difficult.
Perhaps the most complex set of decisions involves market access. The United
States will surely fight for the application of the Swiss harmonizing formula
through expansion of tariff-rate quotas, whereby imports falling under the quota are subject to
a lower tariff than imports above the quota. Id. para. 2. 1(i); see OPTIONS FOR PROGRESS, supra
note 8, at 12-14 (explaining tariff-rate quotas).
107 Joint Paper, supra note 13, para. 2.1 (ii).
los Id. para. 2.2.
'09 Id. paras. 2.4-2.6.
o Id. para. 3.3.
.. Id. para. 3.2.
112 Id.
"' See id. paras. 3.4-3.5.
"4 See James Cox, U.S., European Union Urge Cuts in Farm Subsidies, USA TODAY, Aug.
14, 2003, at 3B (quoting Senator Charles Grassley as saying "Itlhe devil is in the details, and
many aspects of the proposal need to be developed").
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to the most important tariffs, and conversely, the EU will seek application of
simple average tariff reductions. Once that is decided, the parties will begin
arguing anew over the coefficient to be utilized in the Swiss formula and
average and minimum reduction amounts.
Perhaps less contentious are domestic support and export credit figures. In
each area the parties were relatively appeased with neither drastically
abandoning their original positions. Regarding domestic support, both the
United States and EU agree that Amber Box support should be reduced, and
the United States achieved its goal of limiting support with a five percent cap
on support that is less trade distorting.
The Joint Paper reached its fairest and most respectable conclusion on
export competition. With parallel disciplines on export subsidies and credits,
both parties are forced to relinquish some support, but will simultaneously reap
the benefits of the other's reductions. Nonetheless, a myriad of problems
remain after the presentation of the Joint Paper.
Although the United States and EU are powerhouses in the agricultural
arena and pivotal to the success of WTO agreements, one cannot forget that
147 other members also have a role in approving a final agreement. From the
perspective of other developed and developing nations, the Joint Paper was
wanting." 5  Many European and American domestic subsidies, which
respectively total $88 billion and $52 billion annually, are included in the Blue
Box, and thus are not governed by Joint Paper restrictions." 6 Further, many
developing nations, being agricultural exporters, saw the Joint Paper as an
attempt to open their doors via tariff reductions without demanding similar
domestic support sacrifices from the United States and EU.'17 Also unhelpful
was the lack of concrete numbers, for developing nations could be confident
that the farm lobby in developed countries would work hard to keep final
liberalization commitments at a minimum. 18
"' See Naomi Koppel, U.S., EUForge Compromise On Farm Trade, WASH. POST, Aug. 14,
2003, at El (quoting India's WTO ambassador as saying the proposal is not feasible for India,
Australia's ambassador as saying the proposal is an accommodation to the U.S. and EU, and
Brazil's ambassador as saying he is wary of the proposal).
... An Agreement to Deal, supra note 100.
17 See Paul Meller & David Barboza, Deal Reached on Subsidies for Farmers, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2003, at Cl (quoting Indian Ambassador to the WTO K.M. Chandrasekhar as saying
the proposal "seems to be an attempt to pry open the developing country markets without clear
commitments on the part of either the United States or the EU to open their own markets").
18 An Agreement to Deal, supra note 100.
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3. G21 Communiqu
Only days after the United States and EU reached an agreement, WTO
General Council Chairperson Carlos Perez del Castillo submitted a draft
Cancfin Ministerial text to trade ministers that largely reflected the posture of
the Joint Paper." 9 In response to the draft and its perceived unfairness, Indian
Ambassador to the WTO K.M. Chandrasekhar took the initiative in forming
a curious group of twenty-one African, Caribbean, Asian, and Latin nations. 2 '
Serving as a counterweight to the United States and EU, the G21 presented its
own modalities paper shortly before the Cancun meeting.'2 ' The Joint EC-U.S.
Paper, no longer the sole basis for negotiations, was flanked by the Communi-
qu6. The cornerstone of the Communiqu6 is the elimination of circumvention
techniques used by developed nations to overcome restrictions. In domestic
support, for instance, the Communiqud abandons the Blue Box classification,
which often serves as a receptacle for support disallowed in other classifica-
tions. 2 Export subsidies are also more tightly controlled so that export credits
and food aid cannot be used as an end-run around export subsidy regulations.
And in the area of market access, the Communiqu6 culls the availability of
special safeguards for developed nations.'23
The Communiqu6 is bold in that it abandons the URAA convention of
grouping domestic support in Green, Blue, and Amber Boxes according to the
level of trade distortion. The reluctance of the G21 to follow the URAA stems
from the propensity of developed nations to simply reclassify Amber Box
payments in another category to avoid restrictions.2 4 The most egregious
example of the deleterious effects of such actions involves cotton. The United
States and China, two countries that account for forty-five percent of the
world's cotton growth, spend over $3 billion and $1.2 billion, respectively,
annually on cotton subsidies, with the EU giving $700 million annually to
". World Trade Organization Draft Cancun Ministerial Text (Aug. 24,2003), athttp://www.
wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min03_e/drafLdecLe.htm [hereinafter First Draft Text].
120 The exact size and membership of the G21 fluctuated, but its membership hovered around
twenty-one members. See supra note 15 for a list of G21 members.
121 G21 Communiqud, supra note 15.
122 Id. art. 1.1(iii).
123 See generally India: Statement by H.E. Mr. Arun Jaitley, Minister of Commerce and
Industry and Law and Justice, WTO Ministerial Conference, 5th Sess. (Cancion), WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(03)/ST/7 (2003).
.24 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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growers in Greece and Spain.125 The result is a dramatic price depression on
the world market that sullies the livelihood of some 10 million cotton growers
in West Africa.126  Consequently, the Communiqu6 is designed to end
developed-world-relished domestic support that is made possible through Blue
Box classification.
However, like the Joint Paper, the Communiqu6 leaves out concrete figures
and is only meant to be a framework. This framework accomplishes a fair
level of harmonization by subjecting domestic support measures to reductions
within a yet to be determined range with the products benefiting from the
largest amount of support subject to reductions in the upper end of the range.'27
The Communiqu6 also reduces de minimis spending for developed
countries,'28 the sum of the AMS and de minimis spending also being cut by
an unspecified minimum percentage. 2 9 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly
to escape a situation similar to the cotton debacle, the Communiqu6 caps
and/or reduces Green Box support for developed countries. 3 '
The Joint Paper and Communiqu6 have remarkably similar market access
provisions that stipulate a hybrid method for reducing tariffs. Like the Joint
Paper, the Communiqu6 suggests subjecting some tariffs to a simple average
reduction, but contains the additional element of further reducing tariffs on
processed products when such tariffs are higher than the tariff on the product
in its primary form.' Other tariff lines are subject to the Swiss harmonizing
formula, while still other products are duty free.' Another similarity is the
application of a ceiling under which all tariffs must fall by either reducing
tariffs directly or expanding tariff rate quotas. "
25 A Great Yarn, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2003, at 43.
126 See id. Notably, in a case filed by Brazil, a WTO dispute settlement panel determined the
United States to be in violation of WTO subsidy commitments. WTO Dispute Settlement Panel
Report on U.S. Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/R (2004); seealsoA Knotty
Problem; America and the WTO, ECONOMIST, May 1, 2004, at 77 (summarizing the WTO's
ruling). The United States has since filed an appeal. United States - Subsidies on Upland
Cotton: Notification of an Appeal by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/17 (2004).
127 G21 Communiqu6, supra note 15.
128 Id. para. 1.1(iv).
129 Id para. 1.1(v). De minimis spending is maintained at existing levels for developing
countries. Id para. 1.4.
130 Id. para. 1.2.
131 Id. para. 2.1(i).
132 Id. para. 2.1(ii-iii).
' Id. para. 2.2. Regarding tariff rate quotas, see supra note 106.
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The Communiqu6 departs from the Joint Paper by requiring that the special
agricultural safeguard be discontinued for developed countries. 1 4 Also, the
Communiqu6 expands the amount of duty-free access available to developing
countries by eliminating duties on tropical products, as well as on some
percentage of agricultural imports from developing nations.'35 Finally, while
the Joint Paper only calls for special and differential treatment in the form of
lower tariff reductions and longer implementation periods, the Communiqud
resembles the Harbinson Proposal in calling for the establishment of "special
products" not subject to tariff reductions, and average and minimum cuts for
the remaining tariff lines.136
Lastly, with regard to export subsidies, the Communiqu6 abandons the
parallel approach used in the Joint Paper. A logical fear is that linking export
subsidies and credits, rather than having the intended effect of encouraging
quicker liberalization, would force the United States and EU into a truce
whereby each maintains their respective payment programs to avoid export
competition reductions altogether. Instead, the Communiqud proposes phasing
out export subsidies in similar fashion to the Joint Paper, whereby export
subsidies on products enumerated by developing countries are phased out
rapidly and other export subsidies are phased out at a slower pace.'37 The
Communiqu6 also requires development of disciplines to prevent commercial
displacement through food aid programs. 3' But the Communiqu6 fails to
elucidate how export credits, a crucially important issue to the developing
world, are to be governed. It only calls for disciplines to be "implemented on
a rules based approach" to prevent circumvention of export subsidy commit-
ments. 139 Unfortunately, the method for creating such a regime is not
articulated in the Communiqu6, leaving unanswered what the rules of the
"rules based approach" might entail. For this reason, the Joint Paper's
treatment of export subsidies is superior and at least ensures some level of
export credit reduction vis-A-vis export subsidy reduction commitments.
140
In sum, the Communiqud is roughly similar to the Joint Paper, but does not
reflect some of the specific elements laid out by the United States and EU.
' Id. para. 2.4. A special safeguard mechanism is available to developing countries under
both proposals. Id. para. 2.7.
'.. Id. para. 2.5.
136 Id. para. 2.6
137 Id. para. 3.3L
139 Id. para. 3.3
139 Id. para. 3.2.
"40 Joint Paper, supra note 13, para. 3.2.
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Because the United States desires reductions in domestic support as well, the
G21 might be able to court its support in abandoning the URAA box
classification. Such a move would bring the United States back to the more
drastic approach it assumed in its original WTO agriculture proposal.'41
Intense pressure from the EU, however, will very likely constrain the United
States from assuming a position more aggressive than that agreed to in the
Joint Paper.
The Communiqud and the Joint Paper most closely resemble one another
in the area of market access. Both call for the dual application of a simple
average reduction and the Swiss harmonizing formula. But while a market
access framework is easily drafted and an agreement seems achievable, the
substance of the framework may prove immensely difficult to settle. As was
concluded regarding the Joint Paper, genuine market access negotiations
commence with choosing the actual figures to be applied inside the framework,
not in finding a general structure. Members may agree to reduce tariffs in
principle, but as is historically the case, actual tariff reduction commitments
will be fiercely debated.
Lastly, the Communiqu6 unequivocally rejects the Joint Paper's export
competition provisions. While the Joint Paper was innovative in finding
consensus by intimately linking export subsidy and credit reductions, the
Communiqud only makes a generalized suggestion of developing disciplines
based on rules. Thus almost by default, the Communiqu6 appears unlikely to
exert influence on the Joint Paper's export competition framework.
4. Draft Text
Despite the failure of prior efforts to deliver an acceptable modalities text,
genuine hope for a breakthrough was carried into the Cancun Ministerial
Conference. On the eve of the conference, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Ann
M. Veneman said that "[t]he prospects for success in the World Trade
Organization negotiations to liberalize global trade are now becoming
somewhat brighter. The new momentum again provided some hope for
achieving historic progress in international trade."'4 2 But hope was accompa-
nied by equal doses of realism about the difficulty of negotiating in a
... See U.S. WTO Agriculture Proposal, supra note 78.
142 Ann M. Venernan, Veneman: Prospects for WTO Agreement Brighter, DELTA FARM
PRESS, Sept. 12, 2003, at 36.
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multilateral context. '43 As illustrated by the G2 I's need to issue a Communi-
qu6, the original Draft Text was ill-received. The cover letter of that text
reported a now widely shared view that the objective in agriculture at Cancfin
should be to add impetus to the negotiations through, first, agreeing on a
framework faithful to the Doha mandate, and second, directing the subsequent
work towards establishment of full modalities."' Beyond that basic agreement
however, developing nations concurred with little else. '45 To reinvigorate talks
and to pull developing nations away from the brink, General Council Chairman
del Castillo issued a second revision of the Draft Text that closely reflected the
Joint Paper while making concessions to developing nations.'46 In the areas of
domestic support, market access, and export subsidies, the Draft Text was an
amalgam of the U.S., EU, and G21 proposals.
Preliminarily, the Draft Text embraces a common middle ground and calls
for a reduction in the AMS and de minimis spending.147 It also establishes
special and differential treatment for developing nations by allowing for lower
reductions of trade-distorting domestic support and longer implementation
periods.'48 Remaining in the text, however, in contrast to the Communique, is
the availability of less trade-distorting payments "based on fixed areas and
yields" so long as such support does not exceed five percent of the total value
of agriculture production.'49 Left unresolved by the Draft Text is the issue of
"4 See Message from Rubens Ricupero, Secretary-General UN Conference on Trade and
Development, to the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (Sept. 10,
2003) (discussing the 'potential of open markets to create jobs and income while urging
negotiators to work together), available at www.un.org/apps/sg/printsgstats.aspnid=49 1; Robert
B. Zoellick, Committed in Cancun, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2003, at A 16 (discussing income gains
to be had from a free trade agreement and describing attainment of a negotiating framework as
"no small challenge" due to the number and diversity of participants).
'" Letter from Carlos P~rez del Castillo, General Council Chairperson, & Supachai
Panitchpakdi, Director-General, World Trade Organization, to Dr. Luis Ernesto Derbez Bautista,
Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico (Aug. 31, 2003), at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/minist-e/min03_e/draftldecLcovletter e.htm.
143 See generally Scott Miller & Neil King, Jr., Poor Countries May Hold Sway in WTO
Session, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2003, at All (reflecting the general displeasure of developing
nations with the first draft).
146 World Trade Organization Draft Cancun Ministerial Text, Second Revision (Sept. 13,
2003), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min03 e/draft-decLrev2_e.htm
[hereinafter Draft Text].
"' Id. Annex A, paras. 1.1-1.2. Developing nations are exempt from the requirement to
reduce de minimis spending. Id. Annex A, para. 1.7.
148 Id. Annex A, para. 1.6
I ld. Annex A, para. 1.3.
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Green Box payments, 5' possibly revealing just how contentious the issue is
between the developed and developing worlds. As the Joint Paper made clear,
the United States and EU are not interested in abandoning Green Box
support.'51 The G21, on the other hand, unequivocally calls for it to be capped
and/or eliminated.5 2 Thus bargaining positions may have been so divergent
as to leave Chairman Castillo without a basis for compromise, except to say
that Green Box measures shall be reviewed to ensure that they "have no, or at
most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production."' 3 Thus,
Green Box support is one of the few areas that saw movement from the first
to second drafts. The language from the second draft quoted above appears to
be a move in the direction of Green Box supporters, namely the United States
and European Union.
The Joint Paper and the Communiqu6 were not drastically different in their
treatment of market access, thus the Draft Text mimics both proposals, leaning
slightly more toward the U.S.-EU position. Again, it adopts a "blended
formula" whereby some tariff lines are subject to average and minimum simple
average reductions and other tariff lines are subject to the Swiss harmonizing
formula. '54 To limit excessive tariffs, the Draft Text incorporates a maximum
tariff ceiling that must be met through tariff reduction or expanded tariff-rate
quotas.'55 This area also saw movement from the first draft towards the
developed world, namely the EU, allowing exemptions for a limited number
of products based on non-trade concerns. The Draft Text also calls for special
and differential treatment with developing nations being obligated to a unique
and less stringent set of tariff reduction commitments. 156 More controversial
are special agricultural safeguards, which the Draft Text leaves untouched,
except to say that they will still be available to developing nations.'57
Although both the Joint Paper and Communiqu6 agree to enable the use of
special safeguards by developing nations, the G21 favors eliminating the
special safeguards altogether for developed nations. Developed nations
naturally oppose such a restriction, thus the Draft Text only says that the issue
... Id. Annex A, para. 1.5.
'5' Joint EC-U.S. Paper, supra note 13, para. 1.
152 G21 Communique, supra note 15.
153 Draft Text, supra note 146, Annex A, para. 1.5.
15 Id. Annex A, para. 2.1.
'53 Id. Annex A, para. 2.2.
156 Id. Annex A, paras. 2.6-2.8.
'5 Id. Annex A, para. 2.9.
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"remain[s] under negotiation." ''"8 Specific terms regardingtariff escalation are
also absent.159
Lastly, the Joint Paper proposes linking the reduction and elimination of
export subsidies with export credits, and thus provides a clearer and more
workable standard than the Communiqu6's generic requirement that a "rules
based approach" be developed. 6' Accordingly, the Draft Text mirrors the
Joint Paper's export competition provisions. 6' Export subsidies on products
of particular interest to developing countries are eliminated; budgetary and
quantity allowances for the remaining products are reduced with a view to
phasing them out.'62 Members would then commit to eliminate trade-distorting
export credits on the products enumerated in Article 3.1 over the same period
agreed to for export subsidies.'63 Finally, the Draft Text calls for disciplines
to be developed that "prevent commercial displacement through food aid
operations."'"
Ultimately, the agricultural framework suggested in the second revision
failed. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick observed that "country after
country had scorned the draft text." '165 Chief among the detractors were
developing nations that, after not receiving the concessions they desired from
developed nations on agriculture, caused the entire meeting to fail by refusing
to negotiate on pivotal investment and antitrust rules.' 66
B. Finding a Route to Trade Liberalization
According to WTO Director-General Supachai Pantchpakdi, "In the end the
ministers could not summon the necessary flexibility and political will to
bridge the gaps that separated them. Sadly, those that will suffer the most for
their inability to compromise are the poorest countries among us.' 167 Many
... Id. Annex A, para. 2.5.
IS' Id. Annex A, para. 2.3.
160 G21 Communiqud, supra note 15, para. 3.2.
161 See generally Draft Text, supra note 146; Joint Paper, supra note 13.
162 Draft Text, supra note 146.
163 Id. Annex A, para. 3.2.
'64 Id. Annex A, para. 3.5.
161 Zoellick, supra note 6. See supra note 6 for an explanation of the role of the Singapore
issues in negotiations.
166 Neil King, Jr. & Scott Miller, Trade Talks Fail Amid Big Divide OverFarm Issues, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 15, 2003, at At.
167 Supachai Panitchpakdi, TheRealLosersAre the Poor: After Cancun, INT'LHERALD TRIB.,
at 6, Sept. 18, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 5261613.
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paths to agricultural trade liberalization exist, however; a WTO agreement is
but one. Thus, before returning to a discussion on how to reach agreements
within the WTO, alternatives must be explored.
1. Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements Outside the WTO
As a result of the inability to reach an agreement in Cancun, members are
forced to consider resorting to bilateral and regional trade agreements to
proceed with agricultural liberalization. 6 The WTO is becoming too
unwieldy to do otherwise. EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy described the
current WTO structure as worse than "medieval," saying, "I'm now wondering
whether neolithic isn't a more appropriate term." '169 Lamy's central complaint,
shared by most others, is that consensus is an absurd expectation and operating
standard when 148 members must negotiate on complex trade issues. 7 °
Further, the WTO Director General does not have the power of initiative, so
negotiations can be pulled at any Member's whim. 7'
Bilateral and regional agreements, or regionalism, offer advantages beyond
escaping WTO inefficiencies.' First, governments can better respond to
domestic pressures by negotiating in the controlled setting offered by
agreements with few parties. Although world opinion is strongly in favor of
increased international trade, most people still believe the "availability of good
paying jobs" is declining and the "gap between rich and poor" is widening as
a result of globalization.'73 Thus, politics dictates that negotiations must be
framed carefully to quell fears over trade liberalization. In a bilateral or
" See Neil King, Jr. & Scott Miller, Cancun: Victory for Whom?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
2003, at A4 (noting that the United States was in negotiations with fourteen countries during the
Cancun conference, with more announcing their interest in bilateral agreements "as the talks
broke down").
169 Pascal Lamy, Post-Cancun Primer: My WTO 'Q&A ', WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2003, at A24.
170 See id. (explaining that the WTO "is unable to handle the weight and complexity of the
negotiating issues with 148 members operating under consensus").
171 id.
171 See generally Robert Z. Lawrence, Emerging Regional Arrangements: Building Blocks
orStumblingBlocks, in 5 FINANCE ANDTHE INTERNATIONALECONOMY 25 (Richard O'Brien ed.,
1991) (arguing that "major regional initiatives currently under way are more likely to represent
the building blocks of a world economy than stumbling blocks which prevent its emergence").
"' The Pew Research Center, World Publics Approve Increased International Trade (Sept.
5, 2003), at http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=68. In reality,
globalization lessens income disparities and contributes to employment. See NORBERG, supra
note 9, at 87-89, 136-37 (notingthat "incomes [are] more evenly distributed in countries with...
open markets" and "employment has grown fastest" in the most "internationalized economies").
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regional setting, the negotiating parties retain more control over the final
outcome of any agreement and are free to act in self-interest with less
constraint, in contrast to the constant compromises that must be produced in
the WTO to keep negotiations moving. This freedom reassures the voting
public that jobs and other domestic concerns will be protected and conse-
quently renders them more willing to support international negotiation.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, regionalism creates momentum for
multilateral negotiations, a process known as "competitive liberalization."
'174
For example, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) creates
open markets between Central American countries and the United States. 75
Wanting to take advantage of the markets encompassed in CAFTA, Mercosur
(a South American customs union), or alternatively, individual nations, will
then have a greater stake in joining the Free Trade Areas of the Americas
(FTAA), a proposed free trade area comprised of North America, Latin
America, and the Caribbean. In turn, the FTAA will encourage the EU and
other trading blocs outside the free trade area to enter into multilateral
agreements so they may benefit from FTAA markets as well." 6 The benefits
of competitive liberalization are two-fold. First, gains from free trade can be
had while waiting for a broader multilateral agreement to materialize.
Additionally, the terms of a bilateral or regional agreement, if adverse to non-
parties, can increase the incentive for those countries to negotiate. 1
77
Lastly, bilateral and regional agreements may be concluded with relative
speed. The flexibility that is gained by negotiating with one or a few parties
as opposed to 147 can produce immediate agreements that contemporaneously
address the issues of the day. The United States, for instance, is aggressively
pursuing bilateral agreements to improve trade while negotiations are stalled
in the WTO. One such agreement was signed on August 8, 2004, to bring the
" C. Fred Bergsten, A Renaissance for U.S. Trade Policy?, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2002,
at 86, 94.
.75 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. & Central American
Countries Conclude Historic Free Trade Agreement (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2003/December/U.S.-Central-American-Count
riesConcludeHistoricFreeTradeAgreement.html.
17' Bergsten, supra note 174.
See id. (making a similar argument based on the U.S. farm bill's increase in domestic
support). See generally Edward Alden & Adam Thompson, Defectors Peel Away from G21
Doha Round Challengers, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 10, 2003, at 9 (discussing Costa Rica,
Colombia, and Peru peeling away from the G21 to work more closely with the United States on
trade liberalization).
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Dominican Republic into CAFTA.178 Similar agreements were also recently
signed with Morocco and Australia. 179 In the case of Morocco, President
George W. Bush pursued a free trade agreement as part of his vision for a
Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013.180 Thus, in an effort to address the
vitally important concerns of terrorism and instability emanating from the
Middle East, President Bush is using bilateral agreements to quickly form
relationships and expedite the promotion of economic and social reform
abroad.' 8 1
But this is not to say that spurring liberalization through regionalism is
without consequence, or even the best policy to pursue. The foremost concern
is that regionalism may force different trading blocs to become isolated.'82
Taking Asia as an example, Japan has ended a fifty-year commitment to
multilateral trade because of the proliferation of regional free trade agree-
ments. 83 Not wanting to be left in the cold, Japan, China, and South Korea are
flirting with membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). '84 Closer ties between Asian economies have resulted in less trade
with the United States, which is relished in Asian markets. For example,
"Japan's imports from China rose from $36 billion to almost $60 billion
between 1995 and 2001, while its imports from the United States fell, from $76
billion to $63 billion."'8 5 A similar trend is also occurring in many other Asian
countries as well.8 6 Thus, rather than forcing economic integration, bilateral
and regional agreements-at least in this context-have led to some separation
of the U.S. and Asian economies. The United States, because of its highly
1 See USTR Zoellick Statement at Signing of U.S.-D.R.-Central America FTA (Aug. 5,
2004), http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press-Releases/2O04/August/USTR-Zoellick-
Statement-atSigning-ofU.S.-D.R.-CentralAmericaFTA.html.
179 United States and Morocco Sign Historic Free Trade Agreement (June 15, 2004), hup://
www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2004/June/United-States-Morocco-Sign-
HistoricFreeTrade-Agreement.html; United States and Australia Sign Free Trade Agreement
(May 18, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2004/May[United_
StatesAustraliaSignFreeTradeAgreement.html.
181 United States and Morocco Sign Historic Free Trade Agreement, supra note 179.
181 Id.
.82 SeeBernard K. Gordon, A High-Risk Trade Policy, FOREIGNAFF., July-Aug. 2003, at 105
(examining the role regionalism plays in reducing multilateral trade).
183 Id.
84 The ten ASEAN members are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
Member Countries, at http://www.aseansec.org/74.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2005).
185 Gordon, supra note 182.
186 Id.
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diversified global distribution of trade, would be most harmed if regionalism
does in fact drive distant trading blocs to an internal market.1
7
Furthermore, disputes are handled less effectively in a bilateral setting than
under the auspices of the WTO. For example, the Canada and U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (CUSTA) governed the trade of wheat and barley between Canada
and the United States.' When Canadian exports to the United States surged
in 1993, U.S. grain producers sought protection through trade laws.'89 In
addition, Minnesota, Montana, and North Dakota blockaded Canadian grain
and livestock shipments.190 Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota also
responded by announcing more stringent truck inspection standards, and
increased inspections of Canadian trucks. 9 ' The matter only came to a
resolution when five years later the United States and Canada announced a
Record of Understanding.'92 Under the WTO, conflicts are less likely to spiral
into a "series of legal actions, hostile words, and border blockades"' 93 as did
the U.S.-Canada grain dispute. First, imports would be coming from a
multitude of countries, so petty regulations erecting obstacles to trade from a
particular source are less effective. Second, the reputational damage and threat
of significant retaliatory action within the WTO discourage such disputes in
the first place. Last, whereas a party to a bilateral agreement may be able to
browbeat the other party, the WTO dispute resolution process provides the
resources for weaker countries in multilateral agreements to effectively apply
and uphold trade law.'94 Thus, the WTO can ensure that the needs of all
countries are addressed and no trading bloc becomes isolated.
For these reasons, multilateral agreements must be the primary, but not
necessarily the only, tool of agricultural liberalization. Although this requires
compromise in an unwieldy system, common goals and minor revisions-like
187 Id.
"'8 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 293 (CUSTA was
suspended upon the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement).
189 Won W. Koo & Ihn H. Uhm, US.-Canadian Grain Disputes, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
103, 104-05 (2000).
190 Id. at 105.
191 Id.
192 Record of Understanding Between the Governments of the United States of America and
Canada Regarding Areas of Agricultural Trade, Dec. 2, 1998, http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/
canada/rou.html.
193 Koo & Uhm, supra note 189, at 116.
194 See White Man's Shame, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 89 (noting the efforts of several
countries to "set[ ] up an advisory centre to inform poor countries about WTO law and help them
bring dispute settlement cases").
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granting the Director General the power of initiative-can quickly cure many
WTO impediments. Regionalism is a legitimate alternative in pursuing
agricultural agreements, but the short-term benefits of bilateral and regional
deals could displace the long-term gains to be had from a comprehensive
multilateral agreement.
2. Toward a Workable Modalities Draft
Considering the benefits of a broad international agricultural agreement,
development of a modalities draft in the WTO is the most efficient and
powerful method for ending protectionism. Due to common interests shared
by developed and developing nations alike in reducing barriers to global trade,
the Draft Text is not obsolete and may yet prevail.'95 In fact, trade ministers
meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, reached an agreement on July 31, 2004,196
that, while limited, revives the discussions ended in Cancun. 197 Like other
draft agreements, the latest leaves details to be negotiated in the future. At a
minimum, it serves as an agreement on how to negotiate. But more optimisti-
cally, the Geneva agreement signals a retreat from the harsh negotiating
positions assumed in Cancun and a willingness to actually implement a trade-
opening deal.'9 ' As U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick stated: "After the
detour in Cancun, we have put these WTO negotiations back on track. We
have laid out a map for the road ahead. And next we are going to have to
negotiate the speed limits for how far and how fast we will lower trade
barriers....""9
195 See Peter Sutherland, Cancun Was a Setback But Not a Tragedy, FIN. TIMES (London),
Sept. 18, 2003, at 23.
196 Doha Work Programme: Draft General Council Decision of July 2004, WTO General
Council, WTO Doc. WT/GC/535 (2004) [hereinafter Draft Decision].
197 See Paul Blustein, Accord Reached on Global Trade, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2004, at Al
(quoting European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy as saying, "I said in Cancun that the WTO
was in intensive care. Today I can say that it is not only out of the hospital but well and
running.").
19s See generally Now Harvest It; World Trade, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7,2004, at 59 (discussing
Geneva talks).
199 Press Release, Transcript of Press Conference with USTR Zoellick at the Conclusion of
WTO General Council Meeting, Geneva, Switzerland (Aug. 1, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/
Document-Library/Transcripts/2004/August/Transcript-of-Press-Conference-with-USTR-
Zoellick-At-the-Conclusion-oL-WT-GeneraLCounciLMeeting-Geneva-Switzer.html.
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Free trade produces prosperity (per capita GDP in the most open economies
is nearly eight times higher than in the least open economies) z° and growth
(per capita percentage GDP growth in the most free economies is nearly five
times that in the least free economies). 201 Accordingly, trade ministers must
proceed with the Geneva agreement and toward a final draft that strongly
values liberalization over the pleas of special interests in the farm sector.
a. Domestic Support
Domestic support provisions in the Draft Text are not far from the U.S.-EU
position, nor are they far from the G21 position. Although the Draft Text
maintained Article 6.5 of the URAA in opposition to G21 demands, the tenor
is to place tighter restrictions on Blue Box support to eliminate abuse. 2 ' At
least judging from the Joint Paper, the United States and EU will embrace
this,203 and given controls tight enough to prevent circumvention of domestic
support restrictions, the G21 can additionally be brought into agreement.204
The Geneva agreement takes the appropriate step of going even further than
the Draft Text to reduce domestic support. It takes the unexpected approach
of applying "a strong element of harmonization in the reductions made by
developed Members., 205 Thus, "Members having higher levels of trade-
distorting domestic support will make greater overall reductions in order to
achieve a harmonizing result. 20 6 Additionally, the Geneva agreement (while
not citing figures) strengthens the Draft Text by calling for "substantial
reductions" in Total AMS and de minimus spending.0 7
It is conceivable that ministers can make even more progress. Foremost,
maintenance of the Blue Box is unnecessary. "The blue box, which contains
the US and EU direct payments that were granted exemption from challenges
under the Blair House Agreement, was a creature of its time, necessary to get
200 NORBERG, supra note 9, at 118.
20' Id. at 119.
202 Draft Text, supra note 146, Annex A, paras. 1.3, 1.5.
203 See Joint Paper, supra note 13, para. 1.2.
204 See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-250, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: CANCUN MINISTERIAL FAILS TO MOVE GLOBAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
FORWARD; NEXT STEPS UNCERTAIN 11 (2004) [hereinafter GAO], available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d04250.pdf.
20" Draft Decision, supra note 196, Annex A, para. 6.
206 Id. para. 7.
207 id.
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agreement to go ahead with the broader Uruguay Round package."2 °8 Today,
however, use of the Blue Box is counterproductive: it is resented by the
developing world and its maintenance is inconsistent with the goal of reducing
domestic support. All payments that are clearly not trade-distorting can be
continued through use ofthe Green Box, and payments that are trade-distorting
can be continued under the more tightly regulated Amber Box. Thus, members
are encouraged to decouple payments from output, as is the trend in U.S. and
EU policy, thereby allowing a Green Box categorization.2"9 All other
payments, necessarily falling into the Amber Box, would be subject to strict
controls.
b. Market Access
Market access is even less controversial insofar as establishing a modalities
text is concerned. The Joint Paper, Communiqu6, and Draft Text parallel each
other. In fact, the basic structure of each is identical: all call for a blended
approach using simple and average reductions along with the Swiss harmoniz-
ing formula.21° Of course, negotiations will toughen as members must agree
on numbers. The pivotal issue, then, will become which items are governed
by the Swiss formula and which are governed by simple average reductions.2"
The Geneva agreement prudently places emphasis on the Swiss formula,
saying "[p]rogressivity in tariff reductions will be achieved through deeper
cuts in higher tariffs with flexibilities for sensitive products."2 12 By predomi-
nately using the Swiss formula, tariffs will fall to open markets more quickly.
Improvement can be made with regard to special and differential treatment.
Indeed, with the leverage gained from eliminating the Blue Box, developing
countries may be persuaded to abandon special and differential treatment
altogether. After all, their economic interests are almost always poorly served
by preserving tariffs.2" First, developing countries lose bargaining leverage
with developed countries by maintaining special and differential treatment and,
therefore, cannot ask for the concessions that are needed to open potential
markets. 214 Second, many of the tariffs erected by the developing world are
208 TIMOTHYJOSLING, AGRICULTURALTRADE POLICY: COMPLETINGTHE REFORM 115 (1998).
209 id.
211 See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
211 GAO, supra note 204, at 12.
212 Draft Decision, supra note 196, Annex A, para. 29.
213 Winters, supra note 38, at 178.
214 Id.
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paid by the developing world.215 "About 40 percent of exports from the
developing countries go to other developing countries. ... Thus, more than 70
percent of the customs dues people in developing countries are forced to pay
are levied by other developing countries." '216 As such, special and differential
treatment only stagnates trade between countries that could most benefit from
the exploitation of new markets and the importation of more efficiently
produced products.
With special and differential treatment abandoned, maintaining the special
agricultural safeguard will become developing countries' central concern, for
absent the comfort offered by permanent tariffs available under special and
differential treatment, developing countries may feel exposed if unable to react
to changing market conditions. Given the potential benefits of reducing tariffs
by eliminating special and differential treatment, developed countries may
view preservation of the special agricultural safeguard as an acceptable
compromise. Of course, the Geneva agreement's language calling for an
"appropriate number" of products to be treated as sensitive must be taken
seriously as not to allow a vast number of products to be placed into the
classification. 1
7
c. Export Competition
Finally, the Draft Text offers an excellent opportunity to end the use of
export subsidies, a goal common to the United States and the developing
world.21 By linking export subsidies and credits as suggested in the Joint
Paper, the Draft Text endorses an excellent solution for overcoming an issue
that previously produced tension between the United States and the EU.219
While all parties must sacrifice, each gains from similar sacrifices by trading
partners. Although the Communiqu6 offered a far different method for
regulating export competition, the Geneva agreement, fully endorsed by the
G21, reflects a change in the G21's position. Now, "Members agree to
establish detailed modalities ensuring the parallel elimination of all forms of
export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect
by a credible end date."22 The only concern now is establishing an end date.
25 NORBERG, supra note 9, at 175.
216 Id.
217 Draft Decision, supra note 196, Annex A, para. 31.
211 See generally GAO, supra note 204, at 13 (discussing export subsidy negotiations).
219 See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
22" Draft Decision, supra note 196, Annex A, para. 17.
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To conclude, bilateral and regional agreements undoubtedly have a role in
liberalizing agricultural trade. In fact, such agreements may facilitate broader
multilateral agreements. But the effect of an ambitious multilateral agreement
negotiated in the WTO so far outweighs agreements on a smaller scale that
members must brave negotiating treachery in hopes of reaching an accord.
The Geneva agreement is a strong indication that the effort expended in
Cancun is beginning to pay off. While terms are still malleable, negotiators
should strive to go as far as possible in eliminating barriers to trade. The
methods available for doing so are ending the Blue Box classification,
eliminating special and differential treatment in favor of the special agricul-
tural safeguard, and setting an end date for export subsidies and credits as soon
as possible.
IV. CONCLUSION
Trade ministers began the Doha Round with high hopes of reforming
agricultural trade. After Cancun, there is no reason to abandon such aspira-
tions. The stakes are much too high. Reduction of trade barriers has great
potential to boost the world economy, alleviate poverty, and raise the standard
of living for countries at every stage of development. A viable modalities draft
to accomplish such lofty objectives is at hand, particularly in light of the
success in Geneva.
The negotiating road has not been pleasant, but trade ministers have
nevertheless continued to make progress. Beginning with the Harbinson
Proposal, each subsequent modalities draft has come closer to delivering a
consensus. The Cancun Ministerial Draft Text, augmented by the Geneva
agreement, is the best effort to date. First, in the area of domestic support, the
Draft Text goes much further than the URAA. Total AMS and de minimis
spending are reduced, and Green Box support is more closely reviewed to
ensure that it has no trade-distorting effects. With concessions that further
limit Green Box support or even eliminate the Blue Box altogether, the
developing countries that initially stalled talks can be brought back to the
negotiating table in a supportive posture. Second, market access is less
controversial. The United States, EU, and G21 agree insofar as the Cancun
framework is at issue. Although negotiations will toughen beyond the
modalities phase, all parties at least agree to the use of a hybrid approach using
the Swiss formula and a simple average reduction. Arguably, by abandoning
Blue Box support, developing nations can be persuaded to end special and
differential treatment, thereby serving their own interests as much as those of
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the developing world. Lastly, the Draft Text makes admirable strides in
further regulating export competition. The approach taken in the Draft Text,
borrowed from the U.S.-EU Joint Paper, binds export credits and subsidies
together, reducing one with the other. With reductions eminent by a credible
end date-hopefully occurring sooner rather than later--developed and
developing countries can certainly agree to this section without reservation.
But as of yet, there is no final agreement. In the meantime, many countries
are turning to bilateral and regional agreements. Although the WTO remains
the best avenue for nurturing agricultural trade reform, the short-term benefits
of regionalism may lure countries into abandoning, at least temporarily, the
WTO and its procedural inefficiencies. As summarized by U.S. Trade
Representative Zoellick, "the key division at Cancun was between the can-do
and the won't-do .... As WTO members ponder the future, the US will not
wait: we will move towards free trade with can-do countries." '22 1 While every
step toward free trade is respectable, agricultural trade liberalization must be
fully and fairly shared. This is best accomplished by returning to the draft
Cancun Ministerial Text as augmented by the Geneva agreement and realizing
the benefits produced through multilateral agricultural negotiations.
Measured negotiation and political vision can turn current points of
agreement into a final modalities text. Thereafter, the difficult process of
negotiating specific reductions will begin. It is therefore crucial that whatever
momentum assembled thus far in the Doha Round is carried forward so as not
to allow the progress made in drafting an aggressive modalities text to
evaporate.
22 Zoellick, supra note 6.
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